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PABON v. AUTO SALES
would have received one-half the estate and the grand-
children one-fourth of the estate each.2
The common law preference for joint tenancies which
prompted the result of the Davenport case no longer pre-
vails. Today, in fact, the courts do not favor joint tenan-
cies." In the Clarke case it would have been incongruous
for the Court to have used a rule of construction which was
formulated for the purpose of reaching a tenancy which
the law no longer favors. It is more important for the
courts to consider that when a testator uses "issue" or
"descendants" without qualification, he almost certainly
has no idea of the legal consequences which are wrought
by his failure to use per stirpes or per capita, or words
which have been held by the courts to have like effect.34
The average testator probably would prefer his more
immediate descendants to share in his estate in the same
manner as prescribed by the statutes of descent, and he
probably would think it fairer to have an equal distribu-
tion among the branches of his family. 5
JoN F. OSTER
Implied Warranty Extending To Persons Not In
Privity Of Contract With 'Seller
Pabon v. Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc.'
An infant driver of an automobile brought an action
for breach of the implied warranty of merchantibility,2
by next friend, for breach of the implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose,3 and for negligence. The
action was against the Ford Motor Company, the manu-
facturer of the automobile, and Hackensack Auto Sales,
Inc., the dealer selling the automobile, for personal in-
2The English courts thought that the word "equally" indicated the
testator's intention that the distributees should hold the estate as 'tenants
in common. Id., 259-260. In Maryland the word "equally" has been held
to signify the testator's intention that there be a per capita distribution.
See Alexander v. Keplinger, 62 Md. 7 (1884).
1 See 5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 50, § 9; Williams v. Dovell, 202 Md. 351,
358, 96 A. 2d 484 (1953).
See Comment, Wills-Construction-Meaning of "Issue" in Testamentary
Gifts, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 630, 632 (1939).
See Schnebly, Testamentary Gifts to "Issue", 35 Yale L.J. 571, 592
(1926).
163 N.J. Super. 476, 164 A. 2d 773 (1960).
2N.J.S.A. 46: 30-20; similar provision found in 7 MD. CODE (1957)
Art. 83, § 33(2).
8N.J.S.A. 46: 30-21(1) ; similar provision found in 7 MD. CODE (1957)
Art. 83, § 33(1).
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juries to the infant driver and property damage sustained
when the steering wheel of the automobile locked and the
auto went out of control, crashing into a pole. The auto-
mobile was purchased from the defendant dealer
by the infant plaintiff's adult sister for the infant
plaintiff's use. With respect to the alleged breach of war-
ranties, the lower court said that the plaintiff was barred
from recovery from either defendant since there was an
absence of privity of contract. In reversing the decision
of the lower court, the Superior Court of New Jersey held
that the plaintiff was not precluded from recovery in an
action for breach of an implied warranty merely because
of the lack of privity of contract between defendants and
himself. The court found the rule enunciated in the recent
case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,4 controlling.
There, the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided that an
implied warranty of merchantibility, chargeable to either
an automobile manufacturer or a dealer, extends to the
persons "who, in the reasonable contemplation of the
parties to the warranty, might be expected to become a
user of the automobile."5
A majority of jurisdictions still require privity of con-
tract between the parties to a sale of goods in order to
enforce an implied warranty.' In the leading case of
'32 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69, 75 A.L.R. 2d 1 (1960).
Id., 100.
'Sterchi Bros. Stores v. Castleberry, 28 Ala. App. 281, 182 So. 471
(1937), rev'd on other grounds 236 Ala. 349, 182 So. 474 (1938) ; Crystal
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathy, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P. 2d 1094 (1957)
Collum v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 135 Cal. App. 2d 653, 288 P. 2d 75 (1955);
Borucki v. Mackenzie Bros. Co., 125 Conn. 92, 3 A. 2d 224 (1938)
Berni v. Kutner, 76 A. 2d 801 (Del. 1950); Studebaker Corp. v. Nail,
82 Ga. App. 779, 62 S.E. 2d 198 (1950) ; Abercrombie v. Union Portland
Cement Co., 35 Idaho 231, 205 P. 1118 (1922) ; Paul Harris Furniture
Co. v. Morse, 10 Ill. 2d 28, 139 N.E. 2d 275 (1956) (express warranty) ;
Booth v. Scheer, 105 Kan. 643, 185 P. 898, 8 A.L.R. 663 (1919) ; Caplinger
v. Werner, 311 S.W. 2d 201 (Ky. 1958) ; Strother v. Villere Coal Co.,
15 So. 2d 383 (La. 1943) ; Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269, 128 A. 186
(1925); Kennedy v. Brockelman Brothers, Inc., 334 Mass. 225, 134 N.E.
2d 747 (1956) ; Pease & Dwyer Co. v. Somera Planting Co., 130 Miss.
147, 93 So. 673 (1922) (express warranty) ; Finks v. Viking Refrigerators,
235 Mo. App. 679, 147 S.W. 2d 124 (1940) ; Pearlman v. Garrod Shoe
Co., Inc., 276 N.Y. 172, 11 N.E. 2d 718 (1937) ; Marler v. Pearlman's
R.R. Salvage Co., 230 N.C. 121, 52 S.E. 2d 3 (1949); Wood v. Advance
Rumely Thresher Co., 60 N.D. 284, 234 N.W. 517 (1931); Wood v.
General Electric Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E. 2d 8 (1953); Miller
v. Hand Ford Sales, Inc., 340 P. 2d 181 (Or. 1959); Bonenberger v.
Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28 A. 2d 913, 143 A.L.R. 1417
(1942); Lombardi v. California Packing Sales Company, 83 R.I. 51, 112
A. 2d 701 (1955) ; Odom v. Ford Motor Company, 230 S.C. 320, 95 S.E.
2d 601 (1956); Brown v. Howard, 285 S.W. 2d 752 (Tex. 1955); H. M.
Gleason and Co. v. International Harvester Co., 197 Va. 255, 88 S.E. 2d
904 (1955) ; Williams v. S. H. Kress & Company, 48 Wash. 2d 88, 291
P. 2d 662 (1955) ; Cohan v. Associated Fur Farms, 261 Wis. 584, 53 N.W.
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Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co.,7 the New York Court of Appeals
stated:
"The general rule is that a manufacturer or seller
of food, or other articles of personal property, is not
liable to third persons, under an implied warranty,
who have no contractual relations with him. The
reason for this rule is that privity of contract does not
exist between the seller and such third persons, and
unless there be privity of contract, there can be no
implied warranty."s
The basis upon which this doctrine rests is that since the
implied warranty has its origin in the sales contract, there
can therefore be neither rights nor duties involving a
warranty except insofar as there are contractual relation-
ships supporting them.9 It is said that, aside from the legal
argument, if the requirement of privity were abolished,
there would emerge a new flock of evils, perhaps more
injurious, than those arising from a strict adherence to the
rule: fraudulent claims are easily pretended and difficult
to combat. 10
On the other hand, it is reasoned, since warranty obliga-
tions are not necessarily promissory and are implied by
law, the absence of contractual relations is a far from con-
vincing argument against recovery in such a case.1
Many courts, however, while adhering to the majority
rule, except certain classes of cases involving injuries to
parties not in privity with the seller or manufacturer.
This exception is particularly prevalent in cases involving
unwholesome food.12 Various theories are advanced as a
2d 788 (1952). Cf. Jarnot v. Ford Motor Company, 191 Pa. Super. 422.
156 A. 2d 568 (1959). In general, see 46 Am. Jur. 487, Sales, § 306; 77
C.J.S. 1121, Sales, § 305; 142 A.L.R. 1490 (1943) ; 140 A.L.R. 191 (1942)
111 A.L.R. 1239 (1937) ; 105 A.L.R. 1502 (1936); 88 A.L.R. 527 (1934)
63 A.L.R. 340 (1929) ; 39 A.L.R. 992 (1925) ; 17 A.L.R. 672 (1922).
'235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576, 37 A.L.R. 1533 (1923).
8 Id., 578.
Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N.E. 785, 786 (1916).
'oVOLD, SALEs, (2nd ed. 1959) § 93, 452.
'Id., 451.
12 Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathy, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P. 2d 1094
(1957); Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 43 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P. 2d 1041
(1954); Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 332 Ill. App. 117,
74 N.E. 2d 162 (1947) ; Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P. 2d 317, 28
A.L.R. 2d 887 (1953) ; Miller v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 70 So.
2d 409 (La. 1954) ; Grapico Bottling Co. v. Ennis, 140 Miss. 502, 106 So.
97, 44 A.L.R. 124 (1925); Williams v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 285 S.W.
2d 53 (Mo. 1955) ; Menaker v. Supplee-Wills-Jones Milk Co., 125 Pa.
Super. 76, 189 A. 714 (1937) ; Bowman Biscuit Co. v. Hines, 240 S.W. 2d
467 (Tex. 1951) ; Nelson v. West Coast Dairy Co., 5 Wash. 2d 284, 105
P. 2d 76, 130 A.L.R. 606 (1940).
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basis upon which to rest this exception. One leading case,
Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps,3 held the manu-
facturer of tainted food liable to a party with whom he was
not in privity and who was made ill from its consumption,
stating, "[1]iability in such a case is not based on negli-
gence, nor on a breach of the usual implied contractual
warranty, but on the broad principle of public policy to
protect human health and life." 4 Among the other theories
advanced in this area by various courts are: (1) The manu-
facturer or dealer is liable on the basis that the warranty
runs with the sale of the article. 5 (2) The requirements of
privity are satisfied by the commercial advertising and
merchandising methods of the defendant. 6 (3) Since the
manufacturer of food impliedly warrants its quality to the
dealer and since the manufacturer is fully aware that the
dealer will pass the food to a member of the public, the
implied warranty in favor of the dealer is also in favor of
the ultimate consumer, under a third party beneficiary
rationale. 7 Although these theories might be equally ap-
plicable to other situations, the courts have, in general,
refused to expand their application outside food cases.
There are, however, still a number of jurisdictions which
refuse to allow recovery in the absence of privity, even in
unwholesome food cases."8 A recent Rhode Island case, 9
for example, while recognizing the problem faced by the
ultimate consumer, 'held that if there were to be any change
in the usual policy, it must come from the legislature and
not the courts.
The trend, nevertheless, seems to be away from the
requirement of privity, not only in food cases, but also in
other areas.20 It should be noted that in most of these cases
13139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. 2d 828, 142 A.L.R. 1479 (1942).
1 ., 829.
15Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago; Grapico Bottling Co.
v. Ennis, both supra, n. 12.
" Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275,
90 S.W. 2d 445 (1936).
"Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
18 Birmingham Cherco-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark, 205 Ala. 678, 89 So.
64, 17 A.L.R. 667 (1921) ; Borucki v. MacKenzie Bros. Co., 125 Conn. 92,
3 A. 2d 224 (1938); Bourcheix v. Willow Brook Dairy, 268 N.Y. 1,
196 N.E. 617, 98 A.L.R. 1492 (1935); Colonna v. Rosedale Dairy Co.,
166 Va. 314, 186 S.E. 94 (1936).
11 Lombardi v. California Packing Sales Company, 83 R.I. 51, 112 A. 2d
701 (1955).
0Free v. Sluss, 87 Cal. App. 2d 933, 197 P. 2d 854 (1948) (soap in
labeled wrapper unfit for use) ; Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167
Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E. 2d 612, 75 A.L.R. 2d 103 (1958) (damage to retail
customer's hair by application of nationally advertised home permanent
[VOL. XXI
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the party bringing the action was a sub-purchaser of a
nationally advertised product or of an article within a
labeled package on which were express representations
as to quality. The California court, in Burr v. Sherwin
Williams Co.,21 seems to feel that this is the second possible
exception to the general rule. The courts, in allowing re-
covery against the manufacturer, ground the recovery on
breach of an express warranty, rather than the 'breach
of an implied warranty.22 The principal case,2" however, in
applying the rule of the Henningse 24 decision, grounded
liability on breach of an implied warranty.
The approach of the Uniform Commercial Code con-
forms to the modern trend of extending the application
of implied warranties to those not in privity with the
warrantor. The Code expressly protects the members of
the family or household group of the buyer. 5 There is, of
course, no such provision in the Uniform Sales Act.26
Maryland has long recognized the general rule that an
"action cannot 'be maintained on the theory of an implied
warranty where there is no privity of contract, ' '2 and this
doctrine has been followed in subsequent cases.2 A recent
case 29 decided by the Municipal Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, the court applying the Maryland
law on the subject, found "there are no warranties between
set) ; Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P. 2d 409 (1932), aff'd
171 Wash. 123, 35 P. 2d 1090, 88 A.L.R. 521 (1934) (auto advertised as
equipped with shatter-proof windshield); WAITE, SALES (2nd ed. 1938)
204; WnmIsTON, SAYLs (Rev. ed. 1948) § 244 (a).
2142 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P. 2d 1041 (1954).
- Free v. Sluss; Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.; Baxter v. Ford
Motor Co., all supra, n. 20.
1 Pabon v. Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 476, 164 A. 2d
773 (1960).
232 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960).
2 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318, states:
"A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a
guest in his house if it is reasonable to expect that such person may
use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person
by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section."
7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 83, §§ 19-95.
Flaccomlo v. Eysink, 129 Md. 367, 100 A. 510 (1916).
2 Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 A. 2d 316 (1943), noted 8 Md.
L. Rev. 61 (1943) ; Poplar v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 180 Md. 389, 24
A. 2d 783 (1942), noted 7 Md. L. Rev. 82 (1942) ; State v. Consolidated,
Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., 146 Md. 390, 126 A. 105 (1924).
11 Atwell v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Washington, D.C., 152 A. 2d 196
(D.C. 1959).
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manufacturer and ultimate purchaser because of lack of
privity. ''30
However, in Vaccarino v. Cozzubo,31 the Maryland Court
of Appeals, while denying recovery on the ground that the
plaintiff failed to allege that the meat was properly cooked,
in dictum found the requisite privity to maintain an action
where the plaintiff's daughter, upon instructions of the
plaintiff's wife, purchased sausage for the family's use from
the defendant grocer. This was 'based upon the theory that
the wife and child were acting as agents for the husband
in purchasing supplies ordinarily required for family use.2
Except where the court has found an agency relation-
ship, Maryland has not tended to follow the movement
in doing away with the requirement of privity in unwhole-
some food cases." Notwithstanding this attitude, because
Child's Dining Hall Co. v. Swingler34 held that a restaurant
serving food to a customer renders services and does not
make a sale under the Uniform Sales Act, the Act was
amended in order to cover such transactions. 5 The amend-
ment, however, does not do away with the necessity of
privity. Also, the amendment does not include within its
wording any mention of beverages .3  Whether the legisla-
ture intentionally excluded this term or whether the court
will adopt a broad interpretation of the term "food" and
thereby include beverages therein is a matter of conjecture.
Since Maryland holds lack of privity to be a complete
bar to an action on an implied warranty, negligence on the
part of the manufacturer or dealer must 'be alleged and
proved in order that a stranger may recover.3 7 The follow-
- Id., 197.
181 Md. 614, 31 A. 2d 316 (1943).
2 See 4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 45. § 21.
Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, supra, n. 28; Placcomio v. Eysink, supra, n. 27.
173 Md. 490, 197 A. 105 (1938).
7 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1960) Art. 83, § 94 (1), noted 18 Md. L. Rev.
343 (1959), now reads:
"'Sale' includes a bargain and sale as well as a sale and delivery
and also the serving or providing of food for human consumption by
any caterer, or by any restaurant, hotel, boardinghouse, dining room
or any other eating establishment." (Italics indicate new matter
added to existing law.)
1 But see Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314 (1) ("... the serving for
value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere
is a sale.").
8In the principal case it was found that the question concerning
Hackensack's negligence should have gone to the jury since the infant
plaintiff had returned the car a number of times, complaining of uneven
movements in the steering mechanism accompanied by a clicking sensation,
and the employee of the defendant had merely said that this was natural
for a new car of this type. The negligence count against Ford Motor
Co. was held correctly dismissed by the lower court.
[VOL. XXI
PABON v. AUTO SALES
ing statement from the Restatement of Torts has been
quoted with approval by our Court of Appeals:
"One who supplies directly or through a third
person a chattel for another to use is subject to liability
to those whom the supplier should expect to use the
chattel with the consent of the other or to be in the
vicinity of its probable use, for bodily harm caused
by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and
by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the sup-
plier (a) knows or from facts known to him should
realize, that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous
for the use for which it is supplied; (b) and has no
reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is
supplied will realize its dangerous condition; and (c)
fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its
dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely
to be so."" s
In regard to cases involving unwholesome food or drink,
the Maryland Court of Appeals has held, "[a] manufac-
turer of an article for human consumption is not an in-
surer,"39 but is liable to a consumer where the manufacturer
has not exercised proper care in the preparation of food or
drink and where injury is caused by this failure.40 The
proper care to be exercised will vary in different cases with
"the vigilance, caution, and skill required to insure the
wholesomeness of different products. . .. "" However, it
has 'been held "that where a foreign substance or a deleteri-
ous ingredient is found in food taken directly from a sealed
container, there arises a strong inference.., that the packer
was negligent."42
DANIEL F. THOMAS
8 Restatement, Torts (1934) § 388, p. 1039. See Twombley v. Fuller
Brush Co., 221 Md. 476, 492, 158 A. 2d 110 (1960) ; Kaplan v. Stein, 198
Md. 414, 420, 84 A. 2d 81 (1951).
31 Cloverland Farms Dairy v. Ellin, 195 Md. 663, 670, 75 A. 2d 116 (1950).
40 Bryer v. Rath Packing Company, 221 Md. 105, 156 A. 2d 442 (1959).
"Armour & Co. v. Leasure, 177 Md. 393, 411, 9 A. 2d 572 (1939).
"Bryer v. Rath Packing Company, supra, n. 40, 108.
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